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Abstract 
Distinguishing self from other is necessary for self-awareness and social interactions. This 
distinction is thought to depend on multisensory integration dominated by visual feedback. However, 
self-awareness also relies on the processing of interoceptive signals. We contrasted the exteroceptive 
and interoceptive models of the self to investigate the hitherto unexplored interaction between the 
perception of the self from the outside and from within. Multisensory stimulation between self and other 
was used to induce controlled changes in the representation of one’s identity. Interoceptive sensitivity 
predicted the malleability of self-representations in response to multisensory integration across 
behavioral, physiological and introspective responses, suggesting that interoception plays a key 
modulating role in the self-recognition system. In particular, only participants with low interoceptive 
sensitivity experienced changes in self-other boundaries in response to multisensory stimulation. These 
results support the view that interoceptive predictive coding models are used to monitor and assign the 
sources of sensory input either to the self or to others, as well as support the hypothesis of the insular 
cortex as a convergence zone in the processing and global representation of the material self given its 
involvement in both interoceptive feelings, multisensory integration and self-processing. 
Keywords: interoception; multisensory; face; self-awareness; self-recognition  
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1. Introduction 
Recent models of the self show how the brain’s processing of multisensory information 
underpins self-awareness (Lenggenhager, Tadi, Metzinger, & Blanke, 2007). For example, synchronous 
visuo-tactile stimulation between the participant’s body and a foreign body results in an illusory sense of 
ownership of the foreign body (Petkova, Björnsdotter, Gentile, Jonsson, Li, & Ehrsson, 2011). Similar 
stimulation to the participant’s face and a foreign face results in changes in the mental representation of 
one’s face-identity (Tajadura-Jiménez, Grehl, & Tsakiris, 2012a; Tsakiris, 2008). These consistent 
results demonstrate the dominant influence that exteroception (i.e., the perception of the body from the 
outside) exerts on two key elements of self-awareness, that is, the feeling that this body is mine (i.e., 
body-ownership) and the ability to recognize one’s self as distinct from other people. An alternative 
influential model of the self emphasizes the role of interoception (i.e., the perception of the body from 
within) as a vital type of information-processing necessary for self-awareness (Craig, 2009; Damasio, 
2010). For example, the remapping of interoceptive signals in the cortex has been proposed to underpin 
not only a primary form of self-awareness but also to participate in higher forms of self-awareness such 
as the distinction between self-other required for efficient social interactions. Interestingly, the insular 
cortex, one brain area among an extended self-related brain network, is activated during interoceptive 
tasks, multisensory induced changes in body-ownership and self-face recognition (Craig, 2009), 
suggesting that in this brain area exteroceptive and interoceptive signals converge to globally represent 
the material self. While the dual perception of the self from the outside and from within is a fundamental 
aspect of human experience and a key idea in the history of psychology (James, 1890), few studies have 
looked at the interaction between these two modes of self-perception. Recent research has found that 
exteroceptively-induced body-ownership depends on (Kammers, Rose, & Haggard, 2011) and affects 
autonomic processes (Barnsley, McAuley, Mohan, Dey, Thomas, & Moseley, 2011), and, further, that 
sensitivity to autonomic states modulates the effects of exteroceptive stimulation on illusory ownership 
of body-parts (Tsakiris, Tajadura-Jiménez, & Costantini, 2011). These results evidence the modulatory 
Interoception and self-other boundaries    4 
 
effect of interoceptive sensitivity, that is, the body as perceived from within, on the malleability of the 
representation of body-parts as perceived from the outside. However, these studies have focused on the 
sense of body-ownership that taps on processes that allow the distinction between external objects that 
may or may not be experienced as part of my body. Notwithstanding the importance of ownership of 
body-parts for self-awareness, such bodily illusions have been criticized for not capturing the more 
global awareness of one’s whole body (Blanke & Metzinger, 2008), and the social dimension of 
embodiment as a means of distinguishing between individuals (Sforza, Bufalari, Haggard, & Aglioti, 
2010) and not simply body-parts. 
Thus, while the aforementioned studies demonstrate the role of interoception for body-
ownership, which is a fundamental aspect of self-awareness, the extent to which interoceptive 
awareness might also influence the distinction between self and other remains unknown. To address this 
question we focused on another fundamental aspect of self-awareness, namely, the mental 
representation of one’s own face. Our face is the most distinctive feature of our physical appearance, and 
one of the key ways by which we become known as individuals, both to ourselves and to others. Given 
that the ability to recognize one’s own face is considered a hallmark of self-awareness in both 
phylogeny and ontogeny (Povinelli & Simon, 1988), the investigation of how the interaction between 
interoceptive and exteroceptive signals underpins self-recognition and the distinction between self and 
other can provide novel insights on the nature of self-awareness. To that end, we sought to contrast the 
exteroceptive and interoceptive models of the self and investigate the hitherto unexplored interaction 
between the perception of the self from the outside and from within. 
Multisensory stimulation between self and other was used to induce controlled changes in the 
representation of one’s identity. We took advantage of a multisensory illusion that affects self-face 
recognition (the enfacement illusion; Sforza et al., 2010; Tajadura-Jiménez et al., 2012a; Tsakiris, 2008) 
to quantify the contribution of exteroceptive information on distinguishing between self and others. 
Participants were stroked on the left side of their face while seeing the face of an unfamiliar other person 
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being stroked in synchrony. Importantly, the strokes on the other’s face were delivered either in a 
specularly congruent location, as if the participant was looking at a mirror, or at the specularly 
incongruent side of the face (see Fig. 1a). This manipulation of interpersonal multisensory stimulation 
(IMS) ensured synchrony of visuo-tactile stimulation across conditions, while the stimulation location 
was used to control for the induction of the enfacement illusion. 
Interoceptive sensitivity (IS) was quantified by people’s accuracy in mentally tracking and 
counting their heartbeats. In addition, empathetic traits were quantified, because they have been shown 
to correlate positively with the enfacement illusion (Sforza et al., 2010). Across two experiments, we 
explored whether interoceptive sensitivity and empathetic traits are significant predictors of the changes 
in self-processing during the enfacement illusion, quantified by introspective and behavioral measures of 
self-other boundaries in Experiment 1, and by measuring autonomic arousal in response to threat to the 
other person after IMS in Experiment 2.  
We predicted that levels of interoceptive sensitivity would modulate the behavioral and 
physiological effects on self-other distinction following the enfacement illusion. In particular, based on 
recent hypotheses about the role of interoception on processing exteroceptive signals (Tsakiris et al., 
2011), and its role for the sense of presence and self-awareness (Seth, Suzuki, & Critchley, 2011), we 
hypothesized that lower interoceptive sensitivity would result in larger behavioral and physiological 
effects on self-other merging. 
 
2. Method 
2.1. Participants 
The same 28 female paid-volunteers (mean age = 25 years, SD = 5.6) participated in 
two experiments, after informed consent to participate was gained. This sample size was pre-
determined in a Power Sample Analysis (SPSS Power Sample 3) in which we used the 
difference between high and low IS groups on the subjective ratings of the enfacement 
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illusion reported in Tajadura-Jiménez, Longo, Coleman, & Tsakiris (2012b) as the basis of 
the expected behavioral effect size in the present study. Participants were students or staff 
members of Royal Holloway, University of London. The study was approved the 
Departmental Ethics Committees.  
2.2. Materials 
A photograph of the participant’s face with a neutral facial expression was mirrored 
and converted to gray scale (Keenan, McCutcheon, Freund, Gallup, Sanders, & Pascual-
Leone, 1999). Non-facial attributes were removed with a black template. Subsequently, a 
computerized morphing procedure was implemented (Abrasoft Fantamorph) to produce a 100 
sec-“face-morphing” movie in which the face of a female individual, unfamiliar to the 
participant (~20 years old), morphed into the participant’s face in 1% morphing transitions. 
Two “face-morphing” movies were produced, each showing a different unfamiliar face 
transforming into the participant’s face.  
Four 120 sec “induction” movies, displaying each model being touched on the right or 
the left cheek with a cotton-bud approximately at .33 Hz, each stroke covering a distance of 
approximately 2 cm from the zygomatic bone downwards, were produced and presented with 
a 20'' LCD-screen, 50 cm away from participants. In Experiment 2, participants’ 
electrodermal activity (EDA) was monitored with bipolar finger electrodes. After Experiment 
2 was completed, participants’ IS was quantified by monitoring their heart signal with a 
piezo-electric finger pulse transducer. Physiological signals were amplified and sampled (1 
kHz for heart signal, 250 Hz for EDA signal; PowerLab 26T, AD Instruments, UK). 
2.3. Procedure 
2.3.1. Experiment 1: Behavioral and introspective measures of self-other boundaries.  
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Each experimental block contained three phases: pre-stimulation test (pre-test), 
interpersonal multisensory stimulation (IMS) phase and post-stimulation test (post-test). In 
the pre-test, a self-recognition baseline measure was taken. Participants were presented with a 
“face-morphing” movie depicting the model’s face being morphed into the participant’s own 
face, and were required to stop the movie with a key-press when they felt that the face looked 
more like self than like other (Keenan et al., 1999; Tajadura-Jiménez et al., 2012a). The 
movie was only presented once, and participants were not allowed to adjust their decision. 
Next, participants were exposed to the IMS phase. For 120 sec, participants were stroked on 
the left side of their face while they were seeing the face of an unfamiliar other person being 
stroked in synchrony either in a specularly congruent location, as if the participant was 
looking at a mirror, or at the specularly incongruent side of the face, on different blocks (see 
Fig. 1a). The specularly incongruent condition served as a control condition in which no 
enfacement illusion was expected. We considered this to be a superior control than the 
specularly congruent asynchronous condition used in previous studies on the enfacement 
illusion (Sforza et al., 2010; Tajadura-Jiménez et al., 2012a; Tsakiris, 2008), since it 
controlled for the general effect of increased attention during the synchronous IMS. To that 
end, the synchrony of stimulation across both conditions ensured comparable levels of 
attention, while the side of stimulation (i.e., specularly congruent or incongruent) was used to 
induce the enfacement illusion or not. In the post-test, a second self-face recognition measure 
quantified the effect of stimulation on face recognition. At the end of each block, the 
subjective experience of participants during IMS was assessed with five statements, for 
which participants rated their level of agreement using a visual analog scale ranging from 
“strongly agree” to “strongly disagree” (see Tab. 1). The statements were adopted from 
Tajadura-Jiménez et al. (2012a) and were presented in a random order. Participants 
completed two experimental blocks, one “congruent” and one “incongruent”. The block order 
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and the models viewed in each block were counterbalanced across participants. A different 
model was used in each block in order to avoid any familiarity effect with the shown face. 
For all statistical tests alpha level was set at .05, 2-tailed. 
 
2.3.2. Experiment 2: Autonomic arousal in response to threat.  
A recurring worry with experiments based on illusions of body-ownership has to do 
with demand characteristics when using explicit measures of self-recognition (for a 
discussion see Tajadura-Jiménez et al., 2012a). In order to overcome this potential confound, 
the self-other boundaries were assessed physiologically by measuring EDA in response to 
threatening or non-threatening stimuli that touched the other’s face following IMS. When 
people experience ownership over a foreign body, as a result of multisensory stimulation, 
they also exhibit increased arousal responses to threatening stimuli approaching this newly 
owned body (Armel & Ramachandran, 2003), and arousing stimuli are usually followed by 
an increase in EDA (Boucsein, 1992).  
IMS was delivered to participants as in Experiment 1. Importantly, at the end of the 
IMS, participants observed an object appearing from the side of the screen and making 
contact with the model’s cheek. In the test condition (‘threat’), participants were exposed to 
synchronous and congruent IMS, and at the end of the IMS a threatening object (i.e., a blade) 
appeared from the left side of the screen and made contact with the model’s right cheek 
approximately 1 sec after, with the touch lasting about 1 sec and covering a distance of 
approximately 2 cm from the zygomatic bone downwards. In order to make this movie more 
realistic, the blade painted a path of fake blood onto the participant’s cheek (see 
Supplementary material). We included three control conditions. A first control condition, 
‘incongruent’, in which synchronous IMS was delivered to the two faces in specularly 
incongruent locations, controlled for a general effect of increased attention due to the 
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synchronous IMS. As before, the ‘blade’ appeared at the end of the stimulation, but this time 
in the specularly incongruent side of the face. A second control condition, ‘asynchronous’, 
was similar to the ‘threat’ condition except that during IMS the cotton-bud touches to the 
participant were presented in asynchrony of 1.5 sec with the touches displayed in the movie. 
Finally, an additional control condition, ‘non-threat’, similar to the ‘threat’ condition except 
that the object displayed was a ‘cotton ball’ instead of a ‘blade’ and white paste substituted 
the fake blood, controlled for a general effect of seeing an object approaching the face.  
Each condition was presented in a random order and twice, for 90 sec and 105 sec, to 
ensure that participants could not anticipate the appearance of the object. Participants viewed 
one model in the synchronous congruent IMS conditions (i.e., ‘threat’ and ‘non-threat’ 
conditions), and another model in the ‘incongruent’ and ‘asynchronous’ conditions, in order 
to avoid any familiarity effect with the shown face. The block order and the models viewed in 
each pair of conditions were counterbalanced across participants.  
 
2.3.3. Interoceptive Sensitivity and Interpersonal Reactivity Index.  
After Experiment 2 was completed, participants’ interoceptive sensitivity (IS) and 
Interpersonal Reactivity Index (IRI) were measured. IS was measured by using the Mental 
Tracking Method (Schandry, 1981). While monitoring participants’ heartbeat, and in four 
trials of different length (25, 35, 45 and 100 sec), participants were asked to concentrate and 
silently count their own heart beats. Participants were not allowed to take their own pulse, did 
not receive any feedback on their performance and were not informed of the length of the 
trial. An audiovisual cue marked the start and the stop of the trial.  
Participants completed the IRI questionnaire (Davis, 1983), comprised by four 
different scales of trait reactivity to others: perspective-taking scale (PT), fantasy scale (FS), 
empathic concern scale (EC) and personal distress scale (PD). PT and EC have been shown to 
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correlate positively with the enfacement illusion (Sforza et al., 2010). We therefore included 
these sub-scales as covariates in our statistical analyses with the aim of controlling for any 
individual differences in IRI scores and ensuring that any effect of levels of IS on enfacement 
cannot be accounted for by differences in IRI scores. 
3. Results 
3.1. Interoceptive Sensitivity and Interpersonal Reactivity Index 
IS was calculated from the four heartbeat detection trials, according to the following 
formula (Schandry, 1981): 
 
IS score = ¼ Σ (1– (|recorded heartbeats – counted heartbeats| / recorded heartbeats)) 
 
Higher IS scores indicate higher accuracy of the participants in counting their 
heartbeats (i.e., higher IS). The participants’ IS median score (Median = .67, SD = .17) was 
used to split them into two groups of high IS (HIGH group, mean IS score = .82, SD = .08; N 
= 14) and low IS (LOW group, mean IS score = .53, SD = .1; N = 14; see Tsakiris et al., 
2011). This allowed us to investigate the effect of the High IS and Low IS groups on the 
behavioral, introspective and physiological results, in addition to the regression analyses that 
we report for which IS scores were entered as a continuous variable reflecting the individual 
differences of interest. 
The mean PT for the HIGH group was 18.4 (SD = 5.1) and for the LOW group was 
15.9 (SD = 5.3); the mean FS for the HIGH group was 18.6 (SD = 3.8) and for the LOW 
group was 15.6 (SD = 7.4); the mean EC for the HIGH group was 19.8 (SD = 4.4) and for the 
LOW group was 19.6 (SD = 4.9); and the mean PD for the HIGH group was 11.4 (SD = 4.7) 
and for the LOW group was 14.7 (SD = 4.2). No significant differences between the HIGH 
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and LOW groups were observed neither for any of the IRI scales (PT: t(26) = 1.23, p = .23, 
Cohen’s d = .48; FS: t(26) = 1.32, p = .2, Cohen’s d = .52; EC: t(26) = .08, p = .94, Cohen’s d = 
.03; PD: t(26) = 1.94, p = .06, Cohen’s d = .76) nor for the total IRI score (i.e., the mean of the 
4 scales: t(26) = .43, p = .67, Cohen’s d = .16). Moreover, correlation analyses between the IRI 
scores and the IS scores, which were entered as a continuous variable, showed that none of 
the IRI scores correlated with IS (PT: r = .24, p = .2; FS: r = .33, p = .08; EC: r = .04, p = .8; 
PD: r = -.33, p = .08; see Supplementary Table 1). In addition, the PT and EC scores were 
included as covariates in the subsequently reported analyses of variance (ANOVAs). 
 
3.2. Experiment 1: Behavioral and introspective measures of self-other boundaries.  
3.2.1. Behavioral measure 
The points at which participants stopped the “face-morphing” movies were used to 
calculate the percentage of frames judged as belonging more to the participants’ own face 
than to the other person’s face. These percentages were submitted in a mixed ANOVA with 
timing of the test (i.e., pre-test vs. post-test) and type of stimulation (i.e., congruent vs. 
incongruent) as within-subject factors, and IS group (i.e., HIGH vs. LOW) as between-
subjects factor, while the effect of the PT and EC scores was covaried-out. The main effect of 
the timing of the test was significant (F(1, 25) = 4.93, p = .036, η2 = .165), while no other 
significant effects or double interactions were observed (type of stimulation: F(1, 25) = 1.5, p = 
.23, η2 = .057; type of stimulation by IS group: F(1, 25) = 1.38, p = .25, η2 = .052; timing of the 
test by IS group: F(1, 25) = 1.81, p = .19, η2 = .067; type of stimulation by timing of the test: 
F(1, 25) = .32, p = .57, η2 = .013). Importantly, the three-way interaction was significant (F(1, 25) 
= 4.39, p = .046, η2 = .15; see Fig. 1b). An independent samples t-test between the two 
groups revealed that the change in self-recognition performance post-stimulation relative to 
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pre-stimulation between congruent and incongruent stimulation was significantly different 
between the two groups (t(26) = 2.18, p = .038, Cohen’s d = .82). A further ANOVA with the 
pre-test mean values and type of stimulation as within-subject factor, and IS group as 
between-subject factor, revealed neither significant effects (type of stimulation: F(1, 26) = .43, 
p = .52, η2 = .016; type of stimulation by IS group: F(1, 26) = 3.39, p = .077, η2 = .12), nor 
main effect of IS group (F(1,26) = .65, p = .43, η2 = .02), thus validating the choice of the pre-
test values as an appropriate baseline. 
A multiple regression analysis explored the predictive roles of IS, PT and EC on the 
changes in self-recognition between post-test and pre-test in the congruent stimulation 
condition. Only IS was a significant predictor (IS: R2 = .25; β = .5; t(25) = 2.92, p = .007, 
Cohen's f2 = .33; PT-EC: β = -.06; t(25) = -.32, p = .75) with lower IS predicting larger 
changes in self-recognition. Moreover, correlation analyses between the IRI scores, IS scores 
and the changes in self-recognition between post-test and pre-test in the congruent 
stimulation, showed that none of the IRI scores correlated with the changes in self-
recognition, while IS correlated significantly (see Supplementary Table 1). 
Overall, participants with lower IS judged 8.5% more frames as depicting the self-
face following congruent IMS. This suggests a change in self-face recognition which reflects 
the influence of IS and which cannot be explained simply by the synchronicity of stimuli, nor 
by a general task-specific bias, or a general visual adaptation to the other’s face (Leopold, 
Rhodes, Müller, & Jeffery, 2005), because across both conditions stimulation was 
synchronous and exposure to the other’s face was equal.  
3.2.2. Introspective measure 
The answers to the statements assessing the subjective experience of participants during the 
congruent and incongruent IMS conditions were translated into a scale ranging from -3 (“strongly 
disagree”) to +3 (“strongly agree”) and submitted in a mixed ANOVA with type of IMS (i.e., 
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congruent vs. incongruent) as within-subjects factor, IS group (HIGH vs. LOW) as between-subjects 
factor, and the five statements (Q1-Q5) as dependent variables, while the effect of the PT and EC 
scores was covaried-out. PT and EC scores effects were not significant and were therefore 
removed from subsequent analysis. A significant interaction of condition by group (F(1, 26) = 4.18, p 
= .05, η2 = .14) was observed in the subjective ratings to the third statement (“It seemed like I was 
looking at my own reflection in a mirror rather than at the other's face”), suggesting that similarly to the 
behavioral results, the LOW IS group agreed more with this statement. A significant difference (t(13) = 
4.11, p = .001, Cohen’s d = .88, corrected for multiple comparisons) between congruent and 
incongruent condition was found in the LOW group only (for the HIGH IS group t(13) = .23, p = .82, 
Cohen’s d = .07), while no other significant differences were found (see Tab. 1). 
These results suggest that, only for the LOW IS group, the congruent IMS condition felt closer to 
the experience of looking at one’s own face into a mirror, as compared to the incongruent IMS 
condition. 
 
3.3. Experiment 2: Autonomic arousal in response to threat. 
EDA change scores were calculated for each trial by subtracting the maximum 
response from the minimum response (Petkova & Ehrsson, 2008) during the period 1 to 7 sec 
following object – blade or cotton ball - onset (i.e., the period ended approximately 5 sec 
after object offset). This interval was chosen to be the region of interest, because changes in 
EDA are not immediate but they normally occur between 1 and 2 sec after stimulus onset, 
although the response can be delayed up to 5 sec (Edelberg, 1967). Change scores were log-
transformed and individually z-scored to control for variation in responsiveness (Boucsein, 
1992; Venables & Christie, 1973, 1980).  
No difference was found across the different duration, 90 sec and 105 sec, conditions 
(‘threat’: t(27) = 1.62, p = .12, Cohen’s d = .51, ‘non-threat’: t(27) = -.59, p = .56, Cohen’s d = .17, 
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‘incongruent’: t(27) = -.8, p = .43, Cohen’s d = .22, ‘asynchronous’: t(27) = -.38, p = .7, Cohen’s d = 
.1), therefore we averaged the data from those conditions. Non-parametric statistical tests 
were used to analyze the data (two-tailed Wilcoxon Signed Ranks Test and Holm–Bonferroni 
for multiple comparisons) because of violation of the normality Shaphiro-Wilk test. 
Higher EDA responses were observed in the test ‘threat’ condition relative to the 
three control conditions only for the LOW IS group (‘non-threat’: Z = -2.54, p = .011, r = .68; 
‘incongruent’: Z = -2.54, p = .011, r = .68; ‘asynchronous’: Z = -2.1, p = .035, r = .56; see 
Fig. 2). We also performed linear multiple regression analyses using Hierarchical Models 
where IS, PT and EC were entered as predictors of the difference in EDA between the 
‘threat’ condition and the ‘asynchronous’ condition. IS (β = -.39, p = .048) explained 14% of 
the variance (R2 = .14, F(1,26) = 4.08, p = .05), while PT and EC were not significant predictors 
(β = .12; t(25) = .66, p = .5). A similar Hierarchical Model on the difference in EDA between 
the ‘threat’ condition and the ‘incongruent’ condition indicated that IS (β = -.53, p = .005) 
explained 26% of the variance (R2 = .26, F(1,26) = 9.18, p = .005), while PT and EC were not 
significant predictors (β = .1; t(25) = .61, p = .55). Moreover, correlation analyses between the 
IRI scores, IS scores and the difference in EDA between the ‘threat’ condition and the 
‘incongruent’ condition, as well as between the ‘threat’ condition and the ‘asynchronous’ 
condition, showed that none of the IRI scores correlated with the changes in EDA, while IS 
correlated significantly (see Supplementary Table 1). 
Thus, consistent with the behavioral pattern, participants with low IS displayed higher 
arousal to the threat perceived on the other’s face. These results are consistent with the 
pattern of arousal previously observed in response to threatening objects approaching body-
parts that come to be experienced as one’s own (Petkova & Ehrsson, 2008), suggesting that 
the increased EDA in the present study can be considered as an index of identification with 
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the other’s face, but only for the LOW IS group and following specularly congruent 
stimulation.  
4. Discussion 
The present study investigated the role of interoceptive sensitivity in the sensory-
driven malleability of self-other boundaries. We measured people’s interoceptive sensitivity 
using an established interoceptive task and quantified changes in self-other boundaries using 
the experimental paradigm of the enfacement illusion. Taken together, the results reveal how 
interoceptive sensitivity modulates the effects of exteroceptive signals on self-representations 
as measured explicitly, in the post-stimulation self-recognition test, and by assessing the 
subjective experience of participants, as well as physiologically, by quantifying changes in 
arousal. Importantly, we found no effects of interoceptive sensitivity on the baseline self-
recognition performance. Instead, lower levels of interoceptive sensitivity resulted in larger 
changes in self-other boundaries caused by multisensory stimulation. Furthermore, the use of 
synchronous multisensory stimulation across conditions provided a better control for overall 
differences in attention between conditions than the classic manipulation of synchrony versus 
asynchrony, which can lead to potential attentional confounds, as synchronous events might 
result in stronger perceptual binding as compared to asynchronous events. By using 
synchronous stimulation throughout, we aimed at eliciting comparable levels of perceptual 
binding between felt and seen stimuli, while selectively manipulating the location of 
stimulation (i.e., congruency) to induce the enfacement illusion. 
One potential study limitation was the use of only one measure of interoceptive 
sensitivity, the Mental Tracking Method (Schandry, 1981), which although is widely used 
and is comparable to other heartbeat perception tasks (e.g., the Whitehead method, see Knoll 
& Hodapp, 1992; but see Schulz, Lass-Hennemann, Sütterlin, Schächinger, & Vögele, 2013, 
for conflicting results when performance in the two tasks was compared under stress-
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inducing conditions), suffers from certain methodological confounds such as a priori 
knowledge of resting heart rate, as well as insensitivity of the task to changes in heart rate, 
and possible confounding with ability to retain a count in working memory (Khalsa, Rudrauf, 
Damasio, Davidson, Lutz, & Tranel, 2008; Khalsa, Rudrauf, Sandesara, Olshansky & Tranel, 
2009; Windmann, Schonecke, Fröhlig, & Maldener, 1999). However, other studies (e.g., 
Dunn, Galton, Morgan, Evans, Oliver, Meyer et al., 2010) that have carefully controlled for 
such confounding factors have demonstrated the validity of the heartbeat tracking method as 
a proxy of interoceptive awareness, and its close link to performance in other interoceptive 
tasks such as the waterload task (Herbert, Muth, Pollatos, & Herbert, 2012). Thus, while the 
consideration of the specific confounds of the Schandry methods and its interocorrelation 
with other interoceptive tasks does not invalidate heartbeat tracking as a measure of 
interoception, future studies would benefit by using additional proxies of interoceptive 
sensitivity. Another potential study limitation was that only female participants took part. Our 
sample was opportunistic as the population of the undergraduate students in UK social 
science departments is largely female. However, it should be noted that in a previous study in 
which we investigated the effect of gender on the enfacement illusion (Tajadura-Jiménez et 
al., 2012b), we did not find any significant effect of gender on the strength of the enfacement 
illusion.  
Given that previous studies had reported correlations between components of the 
Interpersonal Reactivity Index (IRI, in particular perspective-taking and empathetic concern; 
Sforza et al., 2010) and the strength of bodily illusions, we felt inclined to include this 
measure, with the aim of controlling for any individual differences in IRI scores. Thus, our 
focus here was not on studying the link between IRI and strength of the enfacement illusion 
per se, but rather to ensure that any effect of IS levels on enfacement are not confounded by 
differences in IRI. There are suggestions in the literature that insofar interoceptive processing 
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is crucially involved in affective processing, there has to be a link between IS and empathy 
(e.g., Ernst, Northoff, Böker, Seifritz, & Grimm, 2012). However, no direct links between 
interoceptive sensitivity as measured by the Heartbeat Tracking Method (or the Whitehead 
method) and the IRI have been reported as far as we know, despite evidence of a link 
between interoception and empathy in terms of brain activity in the insular cortex (Craig, 
2009; Ernst et al., 2012; Singer, Critchley, & Preuschoff, 2009). In terms of the relation 
between empathy and the self-processing model that we propose here, we suggest that future 
studies should first distinguish clearly between different types of empathetic processing (e.g., 
affective, somatic, cognitive) and develop appropriate tasks that can then be linked to levels 
of IS. We hypothesize that different levels of IS might be positively correlated with different 
types of empathy. For example, based on the idea of more malleable self-other boundaries in 
people with low IS, we might expect that these people would show enhanced somatic 
empathy (e.g., measured by tasks similar to the ones reported in Avenanti, Sirigu, & Aglioti, 
2010), while people with high IS might be better at more cognitive types of empathy because 
they can co-represent self and other.  
Exteroceptive models of the self rely on multimodal cues such as vision, touch and 
proprioception, to produce a coherent percept (Ernst & Bülthoff, 2004), such as the 
awareness of one’s body (Blanke & Metzinger, 2008; Lenggenhager et al., 2007). 
Synchronous exteroceptive information, such as seen and felt touch, establishes strong 
statistical correlations that are harvested by the brain to create a sense of self. In the 
enfacement illusion, as well as in other bodily illusions, the available multisensory evidence 
is interpreted as self-related sensory events. Interestingly, exteroceptively-induced body-
ownership affects autonomic processes (Barnsley et al., 2011), and awareness of autonomic 
states (i.e., interoceptive sensitivity) modulates the effects of exteroceptive stimulation on 
illusory ownership of body-parts (Tsakiris et al., 2011). However, while previous studies 
Interoception and self-other boundaries    18 
 
have shown that interoceptive sensitivity might modulate the incorporeability of external 
objects such as body-parts (Tsakiris et al., 2011), the present study shows how awareness of 
internal states might be essential in regulating self-other boundaries and therefore play a role 
in social cognition. Given the importance of one’s face for representing one’s personal and 
social identity and the effects of the enfacement illusion, not only on the mental 
representation of how we look like but also on social cognition processes (Paladino, 
Mazzurega, Pavani & Schubert, 2010), the induced changes in the mental representation of 
one’s face seem to rely on neurocognitive processes that link a primarily bodily sense of self 
(e.g., how I look like) and a more narrative sense of self (i.e., how does the self relates to 
others). We here show that sensitivity to interoceptive signals participate as an additional cue 
used by a self-recognition system to distinguish between self and other. This significantly 
adds to previous results on body-awareness, given the different processes recruited by self-
face recognition (Slaughter, Stone, & Reed, 2004), and provides novel insights into the nature 
of self-awareness, given that the ability to recognize one’s own face is considered the 
hallmark of self-awareness (Povinelli & Simon, 1988).  
Self-perception is characterized by a strong affective element, experienced as the 
feeling of being or seeing “me” (Kircher, Senior, Phillips, Rabe-Hesketh, Benson, Bullmore, 
et al., 2001). According to recent models of self-awareness and conscious presence (Seth et 
al., 2011), high interoceptive sensitivity would provide precise predictions about how it feels 
to see and recognize oneself or not. The sensitivity to such feelings is weighted during the 
combination of multimodal cues that may or may not prime self-identification (e.g., different 
patterns of multisensory stimulation). When seeing another face being touched in synchrony 
with one’s face, the visuo-tactile signals prime a sense of self, but the interoceptive prediction 
of how it feels to see oneself is in conflict with what the exteroceptive evidence suggests. 
This view is consistent with the recently suggested interoceptive predictive coding model 
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(Seth et al., 2011; Critchley & Seth, 2012) used to monitor and assign the sources of sensory 
input either to the self or to others. Brain areas, such as the anterior insular cortex, that 
function as a convergence zone of interoceptive and exteroceptive information, might exert 
top-down modulations on unisensory brain areas that register prediction errors between the 
expected and actual sensory feedback. Given the involvement of the anterior insular cortex in 
interoceptive feelings (Craig, 2009), body-ownership (Tsakiris, Hesse, Boy, Haggard, & 
Fink, 2007) and self-processing (Enzi, de Greck, Prösch, Tempelmann, & Northoff, 2009; 
Modinos, Ormel, & Aleman, 2007; for meta-analyses see Denny, Kober, Wager, & Ochsner, 
2012; and Northoff, Qin, & Feinberg, 2006), we propose that this brain area might maintain 
predictions about how self-related sensory processing, such as seeing oneself, feels like. On 
this view, the self-recognition mechanism might be computing in a Bayesian manner the 
stimuli that are most likely to be “me”. Both interoceptive and exteroceptive information are 
integrated from hierarchically organized unimodal sensory systems into higher-level 
multimodal areas such as the anterior insula, that can in turn exert top-down influences to 
minimize prediction errors across the unimodal brain areas (Apps & Tsakiris, 2013).   
The distinction between self and other is essential for the awareness of the self as 
distinct from other agents (Decety & Sommerville, 2003). The findings of the present study 
are in line with recent suggestions that the representation of internal body states is perhaps 
the most fundamental element of self-awareness (Craig, 2009), because the interoceptive 
system is used to remap in the cerebral cortex the most stable aspects of one’s environment, 
that is, the organism's body (Damasio, 2010). At the same time, this interoceptive system is 
crucially involved in mediating and facilitating self-other interactions. For example, empathy, 
that at least to a certain extent makes us overcome self-other boundaries and merge with the 
other, requires the contribution of both affective and sensorimotor aspects of the interoceptive 
system (Lamm & Singer, 2010). While some previous studies have shown the link between 
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the enfacement illusion and social cognition (i.e., Paladino et al., 2010; Mazzurega, Pavani, 
Paladino, & Schubert, 2011), our study is the first to highlight the role that different degrees 
of interoceptive sensitivity have in modulating self-other boundaries during sensory 
experiences that are shared between individuals. These findings pave the way for a more 
systematic investigation of the interplay between interoceptive awareness and different kinds 
of social interactions. Given the implication of interoceptive awareness (Herbert & Pollatos, 
2012) in several clinical disorders on one hand (e.g., eating disorders; see also Eshkevari, 
Rieger, Longo, Haggard, & Treasure, 2012) and recent advances in our understanding of 
normal and abnormal social cognition on the other (Lieberman, 2007), studying the link 
between interoceptive awareness and self-other boundaries can bridge the gap between the 
“inner” and the “outer” self, and shed light on how ourselves interact with others. 
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Table 1. Mean ratings (± SD) for each questionnaire item for each interoceptive 
sensitivity group of participants (HIGH vs. LOW) and experimental condition 
(congruent vs. incongruent) in Experiment 1. Participants rated their level of agreement 
with the statements using a scale ranging from -3 (“strongly disagree”) to +3 (“strongly 
agree”). 
 
 LOW  HIGH 
Question Cong. Incon. t(13)  Cong. Incon. t(13) 
Q1.  It seemed like I felt the 
touch of the cotton bud 
delivered in the other's face 
.24 (1.2) -.29 (.7) 1.39  .49 (1.9) .14 (1.6) .58 
Q2.  I felt like the other's face 
was my face 
-.3 (.9) .09 (1.5) -1.06  .04 (1.5) .77 (1.5) -1.35 
Q3.  It seemed like I was looking 
at my own reflection in a 
mirror rather than at the 
other's face 
.17 (.9) -.71 (1.1) 4.11*  .03 (1.6) .13 (1.3) -.23 
Q4.  It seemed like the other's 
face resembled my own face 
-.3 (.7) .24 (1.7) -.16  -.49 (1.3) .31 (1.5) -2.19 
Q5.  It seemed like my own face 
resembled the other 
person's face 
.16 (1.2) -.14 (1.3) 1.06  -.41 (1.7) -.23 (1.4) -.33 
* p = .001, 2-tailed, corrected for multiple comparisons    
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Figure 1. (a) The specularly congruent and incongruent interpersonal multisensory stimulation 
(IMS) and (b) mean change in % (+ SEM) of frames judged as “self” across conditions and 
interoceptive sensitivity groups in Experiment 1 (point zero indicates the % of frames judged as 
“self” in pre-test). Asterisks denote significant differences between means (* denotes p < .05, 2-tailed). 
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Figure 2. Mean z-scored changes (+ SEM) in electrodermal activity (EDA) across conditions and 
interoceptive sensitivity groups in Experiment 2 (point zero indicates the minimum EDA in 
response to stimuli). At the end of the IMS participants observed an object appearing from the side of 
the screen and making contact with the model’s cheek. In the test condition (‘threat’), participants were 
exposed to synchronous and congruent IMS, and at the end of the IMS a threatening object (i.e., a blade) 
appeared from the left side of the screen and made contact with the model’s right cheek approximately 1 
sec after. We included three control conditions: the blade appeared at the end of asynchronous and 
congruent IMS (‘asynchronous’); the blade appeared at the end of synchronous and incongruent IMS 
(‘incongruent’); and a neutral object appeared at the end of synchronous and congruent IMS (‘non-
threat’). Higher EDA responses in response to seeing this object were observed in the test ‘threat’ 
condition relative to the three control conditions only for the LOW interoceptive sensitivity group. 
Asterisks denote significant differences between means (* denotes p < .05, 2-tailed). 
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Supplementary Table 1. Pearson’s correlation coefficients (r) for the correlation analyses between the interoceptive sensitivity (IS) scores, the 
four Interpersonal Reactivity Index (IRI) scales (perspective-taking scale (PT), fantasy scale (FS), empathic concern scale (EC) and personal 
distress scale (PD)), the mean of PT and EC which was used in the analyses of the results, the mean of the four IRI scales (Total IRI score), as 
well as the dependent behavioural measures (i.e., the self-recognition change between post- and pre-test in the synchronous congruent condition) 
and physiological measures (i.e., electrodermal activity (EDA) change between the critical ‘threat’ condition and the ‘asynchronous’ and 
‘incongruent’ conditions).  Significant correlations (p < .05) are in bold font.  
 
Variable 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
1. Interoceptive Sensitivity (-) .24 
p=.2 
.33 
p=.08 
.04 
p=.8 
-.33 
p=.08 
.17 
p=.3 
.14 
p=.4 
-.49 
p=.007 
-.36 
p=.05 
-.51 
p=.005 
2. Pespective Taking (PT)  (-) .39 
p=.036 
.56 
p=.002 
-.16 
p=.4 
.9 
p=.00 
.71 
p=.00 
.13 
p=.4 
-.15 
p=.4 
-.05 
p=.7 
3. Fantasy Scale (FS)   (-) .51 
p=.006 
-.18 
p=.3 
.5 
p=.006 
.71 
p=.00 
.18 
p=.3 
.004 
p=.98 
-.23 
p=.2 
4. Empathetic Concern (EC)    (-) .19 
p=.3 
.86 
p=.00 
.86 
p=.00 
-.09 
p=.6 
.28 
p=.13 
.09 
p=.6 
1. Personal Distress (PD)     (-) .003 
p=.9 
.27 
p=.16 
-.27 
p=.16 
.31 
p=.1 
.13 
p=.5 
2. Mean of PT and EC      (-) .88 
p=.00 
.03 
p=.8 
.05 
p=.7 
.01 
p=.9 
3. Total IRI Score       (-) .08 
p=.9 
.15 
p=.4 
-.05 
p=.8 
4. Self-recognition change in the 
‘congruent’ condition 
       (-) .31 
p=.10 
.46 
p=.01 
5. EDA change between ‘threat’ 
and ‘asynchronous’ conditions 
        (-) .25 
p=.19 
10.  EDA change between ‘threat’ 
and ‘incongruent’ conditions 
         (-) 
 
 
 
